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Walker: O'Connor's Dangerous Requirement

THE FAILURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS TO
INCORPORATE O’CONNOR’S DANGEROUSNESS
REQUIREMENT INTO THE STANDARDS UTILIZED IN
ACTIONS CHALLENGING WRONGFUL CIVIL
COMMITMENTS
Svetlana Walker*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Civil commitment is defined as “[a] commitment of a person
who is ill, incompetent, drug-addicted, or the like, as contrasted with
a criminal sentence.”1 The definition attempts to capture the main
distinction between the two types of confinements: it points out that
at the basis of civil commitment lays one’s status, while at the basis
of criminal sentence lays one’s action. The question then becomes
whether the status alone is enough to civilly confine an individual.
Although the Supreme Court already answered this question in the
negative,2 the practical reality is not in sync with the law. It becomes
noteworthy then that sometimes dictionaries capture not only the
meaning of the term, but also the practical reality behind it.
Mentally ill individuals have been secluded from the rest of
*
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1
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 116-17 (4th pocket ed. 2011).
2
See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) (providing that “a State cannot
constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving
safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or
friends”).
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the society for centuries.3 At first they were placed in jails and shelters for the poor, then in asylums for the lunatics, and later into psychiatric institutions.4 Prior to the Supreme Court’s landmark decision
in O’Connor v. Donaldson,5 the “need for treatment” standard governed all civil commitments.6 Under this standard, the presence of
mental illness and a doctor’s recommendation for continuous treatment were sufficient to institutionalize an individual for an indefinite
term.7 Courts and states paid little attention, if any, to the commitment process during this time.8 The era of the “need for treatment”
requirement signified the utmost decision-making power ever vested
in psychiatrists.9 Unsurprisingly, when there is no check on this
power, abuse can follow.10 To correct this injustice, in 1975, the Supreme Court announced that only a successful satisfaction of a new
dual requirement of mental illness and dangerousness could produce
a civil commitment.11 It was no longer enough to have only a doc3

See Megan Testa & Sara West, Civil Commitment in the United States, 7(10)
PSYCHIATRY 30, 31-32 (2010).
4
Id. at 32.
5
422 U.S. 563 (1975).
6
See, e.g., William M. Brooks, The Tail Still Wags the Dog: The Pervasive and Inappropriate Influence by the Psychiatric Profession on the Civil Commitment Process, 86 N.D. L.
REV. 259, 314 (2010) (explaining that “[p]rior to O’Connor v. Donaldson and its progeny,
both the law and clinical practice required psychiatrists to assess only mental illness and a
need for treatment”).
7
Id. at 261.
8
See Paul S. Appelbaum, A History of Civil Commitment and Related Reforms in the
United States: Lessons for Today, 25 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 13, 14 (2006) (explaining that
“what existed during this time was an informal system that evolved without statutory authority, criteria, or procedures, and that placed commitment decisions entirely in the hands of . . .
the medical profession, without any role for the state or the courts”).
9
Id.
10
See, e.g., Testa, supra note 3, at 32 (describing the first documented challenge to a
questionable involuntary confinement that was brought by Mrs. Mary Packard. She was
committed to a psychiatric facility in Illinois in 1860, pursuant to her husband’s request. Mr.
Packard was convinced that his wife was possessed by a bad spirit. His conviction stemmed
from the fact that Mrs. Packard was attempting to explore religious beliefs other than Presbyterian. As a result, Mrs. Packard was diagnosed with “moral insanity” and spent three
years in the institution. Upon release, Mary Packard learned that she lost all her parental and
property rights.); see also John Kip Cornwell, Understanding the Role of the Police and
Parens Patriae Powers in Involuntary Civil Commitment Before and After Hendricks, 4
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 377, 379-80 (1998) (describing the case of one Hinchman who
claimed that his “relatives had conspired to commit him to an asylum for the purpose of depriving him of his property”). The court in Hinchman affirmed “the common law right of
family and friends to restrain the non-dangerous insane for their own benefit.” Id. at 380.
11
O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 575 (providing that “there is . . . no constitutional basis for confining [mentally ill] . . . if they are dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom”).
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tor’s recommendation to confine an individual.12 From now on, the
status of mentally ill had to be accompanied by dangerousness to either self or others.13 More importantly, it became the judges’ role to
examine psychiatrists’ findings to determine whether or not someone
is to be committed.14
Millions of people have been institutionalized since
O’Connor.15 Undoubtedly, many commitments were justified; however, some were wrongful. Those patients who challenged their confinements, seeking the imposition of liability for their wrongful civil
commitments on committing mental health professionals acting on
behalf of the State, faced very pro-commitment legal standards that
were almost impossible to satisfy.16
Currently, to decide whether liability for wrongful civil commitment should be imposed on psychiatrists acting on behalf of the
state, courts look at anything but the O’Connor requirements.17
12
See, e.g., Doremus v. Farrel, 407 F. Supp. 509, 514 (D. Neb. 1975) (acknowledging that
“[t]o permit involuntary commitment upon a finding of ‘mental illness’ and the need for
treatment alone would be tantamount to condoning the State's commitment of persons
deemed socially undesirable for the purpose of indoctrination or conforming the individual's
beliefs to the beliefs of the State”).
13
O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 576.
14
See Brooks, supra note 6, at 262-63 (explaining that after O’Connor, courts became
“the decision-makers as to whether patients have satisfied the civil commitment criteria”).
15
Id. at 261 (stating that “[i]n the United States, psychiatric hospitals involuntarily confine more than one million individuals per year”).
16
See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Wherefore Art Thou Romeo: Revitalizing Youngberg's
Protection of Liberty for the Civilly Committed, 54 B.C. L. REV. 535, 558-59 (2013):
Despite its drawbacks, however, the . . . [gross negligence] standard has
become the best shield for plaintiffs against arbitrary government decision making. An examination of Lewis and its progeny demonstrates
that the Supreme Court’s adoption of the shocks-the-conscience standard
for substantive due process violations has imposed a nearly insurmountable obstacle to holding government officials responsible for their abuses
of power.
Id. See also Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the "Experts": From Deference to Abdication under the Professional Judgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639, 646 (1992).
17
Compare Rodriguez v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1051, 1063 (2d Cir. 1995) (deciding
the issue of imposition of liability on state psychiatrists by reviewing whether the committing mental health professional’s decision to confine was made on the basis that is “substantially below the standards generally accepted in the medical community”), and Bolmer v.
Oliveira, 594 F.3d 134, 143 (2d Cir. 2010) (same); Jensen v. Lane Cnty., 312 F.3d 1145,
1147 (9th Cir. 2002) (same); with Benn v. Universal Health Sys., Inc., 371 F.3d 165, 174 (3d
Cir. 2004) (imposing liability on state psychiatrists only if their decision to commit an individual, under the circumstances, shocks-the-conscience); Obado v. UMDNJ, Behavioral
Health Ctr., 524 F. App'x 812, 815 (3d Cir. 2013) (same); and James v. Grand Lake Mental
Health Ctr., Inc., No. 97-5157, 1998 WL 664315, at *1, *7 (10th Cir. Sept. 24, 1998) (same).
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Some federal courts inquire whether the committing mental health
professional’s decision to confine was “substantially below the standards generally accepted in the medical community;”18 others ask
whether the decision to commit shocked the conscience.19 There is
not a single federal court that would investigate whether the constitutional bases, announced by the Supreme Court in O’Connor, were
satisfied.
A simple syllogism can lend a hand in clarifying an important
point. When an individual challenges his or her wrongful commitment, he or she alleges that the legal grounds for such commitment
were not present; the individual was either not mentally ill, not dangerous, or both. It is logical then that when an individual challenges
his or her confinement and seeks damages, the courts should inquire
whether the person was both mentally ill and dangerous. Leaving
aside the issue of qualified immunity, if one of the requirements is
absent, the committing psychiatrist should be liable. However, under
the present standards, federal courts examine the state actors’ conduct
without paying any regard to the constitutional requirement of dangerousness announced in O’Connor.20 The failure of the federal
courts to incorporate the O’Connor dangerousness requirement into
their existing legal standards leads to numerous intolerable deprivations of liberty without any repercussion.
In 2010, the National Council on Disability, in its report to
President Obama, stated that “[p]eople with psychiatric disabilities
are routinely deprived of their rights in a way no other disability
group has been.”21 This statement is the best testament demonstrating that American jurisprudence has yet to afford the mentally ill the
level of protections that due process of law requires. These protections should not be any less stringent only because the word “civil”
precedes the word “commitment” and because the population affected is comprised of individuals touched by mental disease.
This Comment will provide a historic overview of the development of the presently existing legal standards utilized in challenges
18
19

See Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1063; Bolmer, 594 F.3d at 143; Jensen, 312 F.3d at 1147.
See Benn, 371 F.3d at 174; Obado, 524 F. App'x at 815; James, 1998 WL 664315, at

*7.
20

See Benn, 371 F.3d 165; Bolmer, 594 F.3d 134; Jensen, 312 F.3d 1145; Rodriguez, 72
F.3d 1051; Obado, 524 F. App'x 812; James, 1998 WL 664315, at *1.
21
From Privileges to Rights: People Labeled with Psychiatric Disabilities Speak for
Themselves, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY (Jan. 20, 2000), available at
http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2000/Jan202000.
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to wrongful civil commitments and will suggest the need to incorporate the O’Connor requirements into them to afford truly meaningful
constitutional protections for individuals with mental illness. Section
II will discuss the current constitutional requirements that govern civil commitments. It will also discuss several reasons why, in practice,
the O’Connor requirements routinely are overlooked. Further, it will
instruct courts and states on what they can do to solve this problem.
Section III will explore the development of federal case law in jurisdictions that are split on the issue of what legal standard governs the
imposition of liability on state psychiatrists. Finally, it will emphasize the need for the incorporation of the O’Connor requirements in
presently existing legal standards.
II.

THE COMMITMENT REQUIREMENTS OF O’CONNOR V.
DONALDSON

Prior to 1975, the only standard that governed civil commitments was the “need for treatment.”22 Under this standard, the only
requirements that needed to be satisfied were the presence of mental
illness and a doctor’s certification that a patient would benefit from
treatment.23 During this era, courts and states were not heavily involved in the initial commitment process.24 All the power to commit
rested in the sole hands of psychiatrists.25 Undoubtedly, this power
was at times abused.26 Civil rights movement pioneers and advocates
for the mentally ill ultimately brought to light numerous incidents of
injustice.27 The Supreme Court responded and attempted to impose a
22

See Cornwell, supra note 10, at 381-82 (noting that The National Institute of Mental
Health's Draft Act Governing the Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill “advocated the commitment, on a need-for-treatment basis, of individuals who had ‘a psychiatric or other disease which substantially impairs . . . mental health’ ”) (quoting NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL
HEALTH, DRAFT ACT GOVERNING THE HOSPITALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL (1952)).
23
Id. at 383 (explaining that “[t]he Mental Health Act conditioned detention on a finding
that an individual was ‘mentally ill’ and ‘a proper subject for custody and treatment,’ defining mental illness as ‘mental disease to such extent that a person so afflicted requires care
and treatment for his own welfare, or the welfare of others, or of the community’ ”) (quoting
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 n.4 (1972)).
24
See Appelbaum, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
25
See Brooks, supra note 6, at 262 (providing that “great discretion in the hands of physicians: whether a person requires care and treatment for mental illness requires a clinician to
simply exercise clinical judgment as a way to determine whether a patient satisfies the legal
criteria for civil commitment”).
26
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
27
See Cornwell, supra note 10, at 380 (stating that “sharp increases in the number of psy-
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check on physicians’ prior unrestricted power.28
In Addington v. Texas,29 the Supreme Court proclaimed that
“civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”30 In O’Connor,
the Supreme Court established such constitutional protections and
provided that only a simultaneous showing of both mental illness and
dangerousness, either to one’s self or to others, can justify one’s liberty deprivation.31 This remains the governing standard to this day.
In O’Connor, Kenneth Donaldson, a psychiatric patient of fifteen years, brought an action challenging his confinement.32 He argued that the state hospital staff had “intentionally and maliciously
deprived him of his constitutional right to liberty.”33 Although he
was clinically diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia,34 he showed
no signs of being dangerous, neither to himself nor to anyone else
throughout the entire duration of his commitment.35 The Supreme
Court declared that “a State cannot constitutionally confine without
more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in
the freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible
family members or friends.”36
The practical effect of the newly announced standard was profound. In replacing the old “need for treatment” standard with the
new, seemingly objective criteria, the Court transferred the ultimate
decision-making power from psychiatrists to judges.37 Going forward, it was no longer sufficient for a psychiatrist to merely certify
chiatric hospitals, combined with public concern about erroneous commitment and the personal rights of the insane, led to the enactment of statutes in various states specifying substantive standards for commitment”).
28
See O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 563.
29
441 U.S. 418 (1979).
30
Id. at 425.
31
O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 575.
32
Id. at 564-65.
33
Id. at 565.
34
Id. at 565-66.
35
Id. at 568.
36
O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 576.
37
See Brooks, supra note 6, at 262-63:
In theory, the imposition of a dangerousness requirement in lieu of a care
and treatment standard limited the amount of clinical discretion psychiatrists exercised because it provided more objective criteria to govern civil commitment . . . [and that] courts become the decision-makers as to
whether patients have satisfied the civil commitment criteria.
Id.
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that a mentally ill patient would benefit from treatment.38 Psychiatrists were now required to support such certification by showing that
the patient was also dangerous.39 Judges were to examine the findings of the psychiatrists and to determine whether or not an individual was to be confined.40
Further, in acknowledging the need to impose a check on psychiatrists’ prior unrestricted power to commit, the Supreme Court expressed its concern regarding one of the potential reasons underlying
continuous civil commitment of patients who pose no threat to themselves or others.41 The Court counseled that “[m]ere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a
person’s physical liberty.”42 Therefore, previously sufficient arbitrary certification of “need for treatment,” based solely on the presence of mental illness and, potentially, driven by animosity toward
the mentally ill, could no longer survive the new constitutional limitations imposed on psychiatrists’ power to confine.43
A.

The Mental Illness Requirement

A successful showing of mental illness constitutes the first requirement imposed by the Supreme Court in O’Connor on the states’
power to commit.44 This was once again reaffirmed by the Supreme
Court in Foucha v. Louisiana.45 Terry Foucha was charged with aggravated burglary and illegal discharge of a firearm.46 After he was
found not guilty by reason of insanity,47 he was committed to a mental institution for as long as psychiatrists certified that there was a basis for continuing his confinement.48
Four years later, a panel of psychiatrists recommended a conditional discharge, providing that “there had been no evidence of

38

O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 575.
Id.
40
See Appelbaum, supra note 8, at 18 (stating that “[p]hysicians and family members are
no longer the sole decision makers.” Now, “the judiciary is routinely involved.”).
41
O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 575.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
504 U.S. 71 (1992).
46
Id. at 73.
47
Id. at 74.
48
Id.
39
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mental illness since admission.”49 At trial, one of the psychiatrists,
appointed to a sanity commission, testified that Foucha’s prior psychosis had a temporary character and that Foucha “evidenced no
signs of psychosis or neurosis and was in ‘good shape’ mentally.”50
Instead, the psychiatrist opined that Foucha, however, had an antisocial personality, a condition that does not constitute mental illness.51
The State of Louisiana did not contest the absence of a mental illness.52 The Supreme Court held that because one of the two constitutional bases for commitment was lacking, Foucha “should not be held
as a mentally ill person”53 and the State was “no longer entitled to
hold him on that basis.”54
Although the Supreme Court in Foucha failed to legally define mental illness, it engaged in crafting its definition in several of
its other decisions.55 The following three Supreme Court cases are
essential to understanding how modern jurisprudence views mental
illness.
First, in Jones v. United States,56 the Court found that any
mental pathology that causes an individual to commit a crime, even a
non-violent one, constitutes a mental illness.57 Michael Jones, a
criminal defendant who was acquitted by reason of insanity for a
misdemeanor of petit larceny, punishable by up to one year in prison,
was automatically committed to a mental institution, pursuant to a
District of Columbia statute.58 The statute provided for procedural
methods of obtaining release.59 That is, whenever a judicial hearing
finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the confined is no
longer mentally ill or dangerous, the individual is entitled to be released.60 Jones took advantage of these procedural safeguards twice,
but to no avail.61 After spending more time in civil confinement than
49

Id.
Foucha, 504 U.S. at 75.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 78.
53
Id. at 79.
54
Id. at 78.
55
See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S.
346 (1997); Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
56
463 U.S. 354 (1983).
57
Id. at 364-66.
58
Id. at 359-60.
59
Id. at 356-58.
60
Id. at 357-58.
61
Jones, 463 U.S. at 360-61.
50
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his maximum prison term had he been convicted, Jones sought an unconditional release or re-commitment pursuant to a different state
statute.62 The new statute would require the State to prove that Jones
was mentally ill and dangerous by clear and convincing evidence, a
higher standard of proof than was required under the statute pursuant
to which he was initially committed.63
The question became whether or not Jones was still mentally
64
ill. The Court’s finding of a presence of a mental illness relied on
the determination that “[a] verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
establishes two facts: (i) the defendant committed an act that constitutes a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the act because of
mental illness.”65 The Court concluded that an individual who commits a criminal act is dangerous regardless of the non-violent nature
of the committed act.66 Further, the Court found that because the
criminal individual was acquitted, such “insanity acquittal supports
an inference of continuing mental illness.”67 Thus, pursuant to Jones,
mental illness is a form of abnormality that leads an individual to
commit a criminal act even if the act is non-violent in nature.68
Second, in its later decisions, the Supreme Court continued
supplementing and shaping its definition of mental illness. For instance, in Kansas v. Hendricks,69 the Court found that mental illness
is a volitional control impairment that makes it almost impossible to
abstain from acting in a dangerous manner.70 The State of Kansas
enacted a statute that authorized commitment of an individual suffering from a “mental abnormality” or a “personality disorder” that
compels him or her to commit sexually violent acts.71 The statute defined mental abnormality as a “congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the
person to continue sexually violent offences in a degree constituting

62

Id. at 360.
Id. at 358-60.
64
Id. at 363.
65
Id.
66
Jones, 463 U.S. at 364-65.
67
Id. at 366.
68
Id. (providing that “someone whose mental illness was sufficient to lead him to commit
a criminal act is likely to remain ill and in need of treatment”).
69
521 U.S. 346 (1997).
70
Id. at 358.
71
Id. at 350 (quoting KAN. S TAT. ANN. § 59-29a01).
63
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such person a menace to the health and safety of others.”72 Kansas
petitioned the state court to commit Leroy Hendricks, the defendant,
who had a long history of child molestation.73 During Hendricks’s
testimony, he acknowledged and agreed with his diagnosis of pedophilia, admitted to continuous sexual desires for minors, and explained that he could not suppress the urge to act on those desires
when he “get[s] stressed out.”74 Hendricks was found to be a sexually violent predator and was committed to an institution.75
The state court determined that pedophilia falls within the
definition of mental abnormality.76 The Supreme Court agreed and
found that the statute required evidence of “a present mental condition that creates a likelihood of such conduct in the future if the person is not incapacitated.”77 Thus, the Court concluded that mental
abnormality is a “volitional impairment” that renders control of future dangerous behavior “difficult, if not impossible.”78
Finally, in analyzing the same Kansas statute and its application five years later, the Supreme Court in Kansas v. Crane79 altered
and relaxed its previous definition of mental illness. It provided that
the State was not required to prove an individual’s absolute inability
to control his or her own behavior.80 Rather, the State must merely
show a “special and serious lack of ability to control behavior.”81
Thus, pursuant to these three Supreme Court decisions, to satisfy the requirement of mental illness, the State must prove several
elements. First, the State has to show that the individual suffers from
a form of mental pathology.82 Second, it has to show that the mental
abnormality presents a serious difficulty to that individual’s ability to
control his or her deviate behavior.83 Lastly, the State must prove
that the mental abnormality can induce the alleged mentally ill indi-

72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

Id. at 352 (quoting KAN. S TAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b)).
Id. at 354-55.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 355.
Id. at 355-56.
Id.
Id. at 357.
Id. at 358.
534 U.S. 407 (2002).
Id. at 411.
Id. at 412-13.
See, e.g., Jones, 463 U.S. at 364-66.
Crane, 534 U.S. at 413.
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vidual to commit a criminal act, violent or not.84
B.

The Dangerousness Requirement

The Supreme Court in O’Connor established that the State
cannot confine an individual if he or she poses no danger to self or
others.85 Following this landmark decision, numerous courts reviewed state statutes that authorized detention of non-dangerous patients.86 For example, in Suzuki v. Yuen,87 the Ninth Circuit struck
down a portion of Hawaii’s civil commitment statute that authorized
confinement of a person who was dangerous to property of any value.88 The court acknowledged that “the state’s interest in protecting
property is not sufficiently compelling to warrant the curtailment of
liberty brought about by involuntary commitment.”89
Similarly, in Doremus v. Farrell,90 the court invalidated Nebraska’s civil commitment laws.91 The court followed the O’Connor
requirements and held that due process required a showing of dangerousness in addition to a showing of mental illness.92 It recognized
that “[t]o permit involuntary commitment upon a finding of ‘mental
illness’ and the need for treatment alone would be tantamount to condoning the State’s commitment of persons deemed socially undesirable for the purpose of indoctrination or conforming the individual’s
beliefs to the beliefs of the State.”93 Currently, all fifty states incorporate O’Connor’s dangerousness requirement in their commitment
statutes.94 Although the requirement is on the books, in practice, it is
not always adhered to.

84

Id.; Jones, 463 U.S. at 364-66.
O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 575.
86
See Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173, 178 (9th Cir. 1980); Colyar v. Third Judicial Dist.
Court for Salt Lake Cnty., 469 F. Supp. 424, 432 (D. Utah 1979); Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414
F. Supp. 439, 449-51 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Doremus, 407 F. Supp. at 514-15; Lynch v. Baxley,
386 F. Supp. 378, 390 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Bell v. Wayne Cnty. Gen. Hosp. at Eloise, 384 F.
Supp. 1085, 1096 (E.D. Mich. 1974); State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 123
(W. Va. 1974).
87
617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980).
88
Id. at 176.
89
Id.
90
407 F. Supp. 509 (1975).
91
Id. at 517.
92
Id. at 514-15.
93
Id. at 514.
94
See infra notes 101-11.
85
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Practical Reasons Why O’Connor’s Dangerousness
Requirement Routinely Is Overlooked

O’Connor’s dangerousness requirement is not without its
flaws. These flaws constitute some reasons why the dangerousness
requirement routinely is overlooked in practice. Fortunately, it is
possible to strengthen the weaknesses that surround this constitutional standard.
95

1.

Lack of Precise Definition of What
Constitutes Danger

The first, and likely the most significant, reason why
O’Connor’s dangerousness requirement routinely is disregarded in
practice is due to the vagueness of the concept of danger.96 Although
courts and states have attempted to define what constitutes danger,97
there is still ambiguity as to what it involves.98 Most states define
dangerousness as a risk of harm to self or others.99 Yet, many states
disagree about the required degree of risk needed to reach the level of
dangerousness.100 Currently, the varying levels of dangerousness
among the states include: substantial risk,101 clear and present
95

Grant H. Morris, Defining Dangerousness: Risking a Dangerous Definition, 10 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 61, 66 (1999) (discussing that although the dangerousness standard
is currently tolerable, it is just as vague as the intolerable “need for treatment” requirement).
96
See Brooks, supra note 6, at 264-65.
97
See, e.g., Jones, 463 U.S. at 364 (declaring that “[t]he fact that a person has been found,
beyond a reasonable doubt, to have committed a criminal act certainly indicates dangerousness”); People v. Stevens, 761 P.2d 768, 772-74 nn.4-8 (Colo. 1988) (discussing the difference in states’ definitions of dangerousness).
98
See Brooks, supra note 6, at 291-94 (explaining some of the consequences caused by
the vagueness of the definition of danger); John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 401
(2006) (discussing some changes in statutory commitment standards); Morris, supra note 95,
at 70-71 (discussing the difference in defining harm and probability of its occurrence across
the states).
99
See infra notes 101-11.
100
See, e.g., Stevens, 761 P.2d at 772-73 nn.4-8.
101
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.30.915 (West 2013) (substantial risk); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 27-65-102 (West 2013) (substantial risk); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-495 (West
2009) (substantial risk); GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-1 (West 2010) (substantial risk of imminent
harm); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-317 (West 2008) (substantial risk); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 34-B,
§ 3801 (West 2010) (substantial risk); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 1 (West 1989)
(substantial risk); MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.005 (West 2011) (substantial risk); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 71-908 (West 2004) (substantial risk); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 122C-3 (West 2013) (reasonable probability or substantial risk); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.01 (West 2013) (sub-
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threat,102 substantial physical harm,103 substantial likelihood of
harm,104 substantial likelihood of physical harm,105 substantial likelihood of serious harm,106 likelihood of serious harm,107 demonstrated
danger,108 likely to cause harm,109 and reasonable expectation of
harm.110 Very few states insist on imminent threat.111 Some courts
incorporated into their definition a requirement of a recent overt act

stantial risk); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 1-103 (West 2013) (poses a substantial risk of
immediate physical harm); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40.1-5-2 (West 2006) (substantial risk).
102
ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.4 (West 1991) (real and present threat of substantial harm);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5001 (West 2011) (real and present threat); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
394.467 (West 2009) (real and present threat of substantial harm to self or substantial likelihood of harm to others); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 10-622 (West 2010) (presents a
danger); 50 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7301 (West 1978) (clear and present danger of harm).
103
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.011 (West 2012) (substantial physical harm).
104
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 25-03.1-02 (West 2011) (substantial likelihood of harm).
105
M INN. S TAT. ANN. § 253B.02 (West 2013) (substantial likelihood of physical harm);
M ISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-21-61 (West 2010) (substantial likelihood of physical harm); WIS.
S TAT. ANN. § 51.20 (West 2012) (substantial probability of physical harm).
106
TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-401 (West 2001) (substantial likelihood of serious harm).
107
N.Y. M ENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.37 (McKinney Supp. 2014) (likely to result in serious
harm); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-580 (West 2005) (likelihood of serious harm); WASH. R EV.
CODE ANN. § 71.05.150 (West 2011) (likelihood of serious harm).
108
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5300 (West 1983) (demonstrated danger).
109
D.C. CODE § 21-545 (West 2004) (likely to injury himself or others); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 229.1 (West 2012) (“likely to physically injure the person’s self or others”); KAN.
S TAT. ANN. § 59-2946 (West 2012) (likely to cause harm); NEV. R EV. S TAT. ANN . §
433A.160 (West 2007) (likely to harm himself or herself or others); N.H. REV. S TAT. ANN.
§ 135-C:34 (West 2014) (create[s] a potentially serious likelihood of danger); N.J. S TAT.
ANN. § 30:4-27.2 (West 2010) (probable; substantial likelihood); N.M. S TAT. ANN. § 43-13 (West 2013) (more likely than not); TEX. HEALTH & S AFETY CODE ANN. § 574.034 (West
2013) (likely to cause serious harm); V A. CODE ANN. § 37.2-815 (West 2010) (likelihood
that the person will, in the near future, suffer serious harm or cause serious harm to himself
or others); W. V A. CODE ANN. § 27-5-3 (West 2006) (likely to cause serious harm); WYO.
S TAT. ANN. § 25-10-101 (West 2011) (substantial probability).
110
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-207 (West 2009) (reasonable probability); ARIZ. REV.
S TAT. ANN. § 36-501 (West 2012) (can reasonably be expected to result in serious physical
harm); 405 ILL. COMP. S TAT. ANN. 5/1-119 (West 2010) (reasonably expected to engage in
conduct placing such person or another in physical harm or in reasonable expectation of being physically harmed); LA. R EV . S TAT. ANN. § 28:2 (West 2013) (reasonable expectation
that there is a substantial risk that he will inflict physical harm upon another person in the
near future); M ICH. C OMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1401 (West 2005) (can reasonably be expected within the near future to intentionally or unintentionally seriously physically injure
himself, herself, or another individual); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 27A-1-1 (West 2011) (a reasonable expectation that the person will inflict serious physical injury upon himself, herself
or another person in the near future).
111
HAW. R EV . S TAT. § 334-60.2 (West 2014) (imminently dangerous); M ONT. CODE
ANN. § 53-21-126 (West 2005) (imminent threat); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-15-602 (West
2012) (at serious risk).
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of violence toward self or others, while other courts did not. 112 The
existence of these varying standards indicates that there is no agreement among the states about what dangerousness entails. However,
because “[t]here is no requirement . . . that due process of law must
be the same in all fifty states,”113 the states are free to provide their
own definitions and impose additional requirements, if any.114 Unfortunately, individual states and their courts continuously fail to craft
definitions that would encompass all aspects of danger.
The absence of a clear understanding for what is deemed
“dangerous” allows committing psychiatrists to rely on their clinical
judgments and categorize reported symptoms to fit into the existing
statutory definitions.115 This works to the detriment of the mentally
ill because today’s extensive research shows that clinical judgments
are very faulty when it comes to assessing danger.116 Typically, reliance on clinical judgments results in over-predictions117 and, hence,
wrongful confinements of non-dangerous individuals. The truth is,
so long as states and courts fail to provide well-crafted definitions of
112

Compare Colyar, 469 F. Supp. at 434 (overt act is not required), and United States ex
rel. Mathew v. Nelson, 461 F. Supp. 707, 710 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (same), and Project Release v.
Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 973-74 (2d Cir. 1983) (same), and In re Scopes, 398 N.Y.S.2d 911,
913 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1977) (same), with Suzuki, 617 F.2d at 178 (overt act is required),
and Stamus, 414 F. Supp. at 451 (same), and Doremus, 407 F. Supp. at 514-15 (same). See
also Lynch, 386 F. Supp. at 391 (overt act is required); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
113
Stevens, 761 P.2d at 773.
114
Addington, 441 U.S. at 431.
115
See Brooks, supra note 6, at 265 (providing that “[t]he absence of . . . clarifying concepts, which would limit the discretion of the civil commitment evaluators, provides an opportunity for psychiatrists to label individuals as dangerous when the doctors wish to confine
people deemed to be in need of treatment”).
116
See, e.g., Alexander Scherr, Daubert & Danger: The “FIT” of Expert Predictions in
Civil Commitments, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 17 (2003) (explaining that “[c]linical opinions
have never received high marks for reliability”); Donald H. Stone, Confine Is Fine: Have the
Non-Dangerous Mentally Ill Lost Their Right to Liberty? An Empirical Study to Unravel the
Psychiatrist’s Crystal Ball, 20 VA. J. S OC . P OL’Y & L. 323, 337 (2012):
For years, the conventional wisdom was that clinicians were rather poor
at predicting future violence in individuals with mental disorders. In
general, studies showed that clinicians were right a third of the time in
predicting whether an individual with mental illness would be involved
in future violence. The standard conclusion was that relying on clinical
experience was not appreciably better than flipping a coin.
Id.
117
See Jones, 463 U.S. at 378 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that “[c]ommentators and researchers have long acknowledged that even the best attempts to identify dangerous individuals on the basis of specified facts have been inaccurate roughly two-thirds of the
time, almost always on the side of over-prediction”).
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what danger entails, psychiatrists will continue to adopt their personalized definitions of danger and rely on their clinical judgments to
commit patients who they find to be in “need of treatment” precisely
on that basis—the basis abolished over forty years ago.118 Therefore,
states and courts are urged to develop precise definitions of danger
that would entail all possible aspects of this concept: level of likelihood, time proximity, and required degree of harm.119
2.

Absence of Legal Requirement to Utilize
Actuarial Methods of Assessment for Danger

The second reason why courts repeatedly overlook
O’Connor’s dangerousness requirement stems from the lack of a requirement legally imposed on psychiatrists, which would require
them to adhere to scientifically developed, reliable instruments for
assessing danger.120 There is no doubt that psychiatry is not a precise
science.121 However, it is still a science with its own knowledge,
methods, and techniques. Unfortunately, even though today’s psychiatrists mastered their diagnostic skills, studies show that they remain non-proficient in their ability to assess for dangerousness.122 Irrespective of these findings, committing mental health professionals
continue to disregard existing and reliable actuarial assessment tools,
such as, “Violence Risk Appraisal Guide,” “The HCR-20,” and “The
Classification of Violent Risk,” that can help them to ensure accurate
conclusions.123
118

See Brooks, supra note 6, at 265 (providing that “[d]octors want to treat people
deemed to require care and treatment, and if they must certify a patient as dangerous in order
to facilitate treatment, doctors will do so”); see also Robert I. Simon, Imminent Suicide: The
Illusion of Short-Term Prediction, 36(3) SUICIDE AND LIFE-THREATENING BEHAVIOR 296,
298 (2006) (discussing that the vague definition of danger can lead committing psychiatrists
to err on the side of caution and involuntarily hospitalize patients).
119
See Brooks, supra note 6, at 265 (calling for incorporation of “all of the components of
a dangerousness determination: probability, imminence, and magnitude of harm to person”).
120
Id. at 263.
121
See Addington, 441 U.S. at 430 (explaining that “[t]he subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnosis render certainties virtually beyond reach in most situations”).
122
See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
123
See Monahan, supra note 98, at 408-13. First, defining “actuarial (or statistical) prediction” as the one that “relies on explicit rules specifying which risk factors are to be measured, how those risk factors are to be scored, and how the scores are to be mathematically
combined to yield an objective estimate of violence risk.” Id. at 405-06. Second, describing
three best-known actuarial assessment instruments. Id. at 409-13. One of the assessment
tools is known as “Violence Risk Appraisal Guide,” and consists of nine categories that are
based on twelve variables. Id. at 409-10. A recent study showed that only eleven percent of
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Such resistance to advance psychiatrists’ professional ability
to accurately assess for dangerousness comes at a steep price. An incorrect conclusion, which typically involves over-prediction,124 or labeling a non-dangerous mentally ill individual as dangerous, can infringe upon the mentally ill individual’s constitutional right to
liberty.125 An incorrect finding of dangerousness wrongfully triggers
satisfaction of the O’Connor criteria, thus allowing involuntary confinement of a non-dangerous individual.126
The failure of states and courts to legally require psychiatrists
to utilize actuarial methods of assessment allows psychiatrists to continue playing an overly influential and decisive role in civil commitments.127 Because psychiatrists continue to rely solely on their professional experiences and clinical judgments, courts will have no way
to carefully scrutinize the accuracy of the psychiatrists’ assessments.
Thus, as a practical matter, even though the Supreme Court replaced
the old, “need for treatment,” subjective standard with what was intended to be a more objective requirement of dangerousness, psychiatrists retain their unrestricted unilateral power to commit individuals.
Courts and states are encouraged to explore a possibility of requiring
mental health professionals to rely on more objective, reliable and
empirically proven methods of assessment for dangerousness.

the study participants, who scored in the first category, later committed a new violent act as
opposed to forty-two percent of the participants in category five, and one hundred percent of
the participants in category nine. Id. at 410. The second assessment tool is called “The
HCR-20,” and consists of twenty ratings. Monahan, supra note 98, at 410-11. A recent
study found that when participants’ scores were separated into five distinct categories, only
eleven percent of the patients placed in the lowest category “were found to have committed
or threatened a physically violent act,” as opposed to forty percent of the participants placed
in the middle category and seventy-five percent of the participants placed in the highest category. Id. at 411. Lastly, the Classification of Violent Risk places participants into “one of
five risk classes.” Id. at 411-13. Only one percent of the patients in the first risk class committed a violent act within twenty weeks after their discharge from a psychiatric facility as
compared with seventy-six percent of the participants who were placed in the highest risk
class. Id. at 412-13.
124
See supra note 117.
125
See O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 576 (providing that only successful showing of mental illness and dangerousness can constitutionally justify one’s civil commitment).
126
Id.
127
See Brooks, supra note 6, at 263 (suggesting that “psychiatrists still exercise . . . an
inordinate amount of influence on the civil commitment process”).
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Heavy Reliance by Judges on Psychiatrists’
Expert Testimony during Commitment
Hearings

The disregard of O’Connor’s dangerousness requirement is
also demonstrated during commitment hearings. Judges disregard the
fact that one of O’Connor’s main objectives was to transfer decisionmaking power from psychiatrists to judges.128 To do so, judges were
to analyze psychiatrists’ findings of mental illness and dangerousness.129 However, irrespective of what O’Connor urged courts to do,
judges routinely make their commitment rulings by deferring to
committing psychiatrists’ expert testimony given during hearings.130
It is especially troubling for the judges to rely solely on clinical
judgments given that judges are well aware of psychiatrists’ inability
to make correct dangerousness assessments.131
Courts are urged not to give extensive deference to committing psychiatrists’ expert opinions during commitment hearings.132
Rather, courts should consider utilizing an independent expert testimony to offer the mentally ill an opportunity to contest psychiatrists’
possibly erroneous findings. Such a vehicle for questioning and testing of committing psychiatrists’ assessments can help to prevent the
commitment of those who pose no danger to themselves or others.
4.

Liability Concern and Lack Thereof

Liability concerns can certainly influence one’s professional
behavior. When it comes to psychiatrists’ liability concerns, they
face two major issues. On the one hand, psychiatrists are greatly
concerned with potential liability for letting a dangerous individual

128

Id.
Id.
130
See id. at 259 (stating that “[j]udges continue to defer, almost blindly, to expert testimony”).
131
See Jones, 463 U.S. at 378 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Project Release, 722 F.2d
at 973 (acknowledging that “the medical profession’s ability to predict dangerousness . . . is
hotly debated”).
132
See Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Commitment Hearing,
10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 37, 41-42 (1999) (providing that “[i]n practice, commitment
hearings tend to be brief and non-adversarial episodes in which judges appear to ‘rubber
stamp’ the recommendations of clinical expert witnesses. Indeed, studies show judicial
agreement with expert witnesses in this area ranges from seventy-nine to one hundred percent, and most frequently exceeds ninety-five percent.”).
129
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free.133 This concern dictates their desire to err on the side of caution
and commit non-dangerous individuals.134
On the other hand, psychiatrists rarely face any liability for
confining non-dangerous individuals because very few wrongfully
confined individuals challenge their commitments.135 The brave
“[i]nmates of mental institutions”136 who attempt to challenge their
wrongful civil commitments quickly learn that the existing legal
standards, under which their claims are reviewed, are one-sided and
overly protective of the mental health professionals acting on behalf
of the state, rather than of those who suffered liberty deprivations.137
While the presently employed standards ensure that it would be difficult for the plaintiff to prevail,138 they fail to incorporate the constitutional protections afforded to the mentally ill by O’Connor.

133
See Brooks, supra note 6, at 275 (stating that “[t]he psychiatrist who fails to accurately
assess a dangerous patient and authorizes the release or suggests a court release a mentally ill
individual who subsequently engages in harm-causing behavior will be subject to severe criticism”).
134
Id. Brooks explains that:
[A] concern for liability can impact a clinician’s decision-making in the
commitment context because it can create a conflict with the goal of
committing only those individuals who, after a careful assessment and
application of clinically appropriate criteria, meet the commitment
standard. When this occurs, clinicians err on the side of protection from
liability.
Id.
135
Id. at 275-76. For example:
[I]f the psychiatrist incorrectly assesses a nondangerous individual as
dangerous, he will suffer no consequences. The psychiatrist’s assessment of likely harm-causing behavior cannot be challenged because no
one knows whether harm would have occurred if the doctor did not authorize coercive clinical intervention. Thus, both the public and the
committing psychiatrist will rarely, if ever, learn about an incorrect assessment of dangerousness, but they will always learn about an incorrect
assessment of nondangerousness.
Id.
136
Jones, 463 U.S. at 384.
137
See Simon, supra note 118, at 298 (acknowledging psychiatrists’ understanding of lack
of liability for wrongful civil commitment so long as it was a good faith mistake).
138
See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 16, at 559 (urging that “[a]n examination of Lewis and
its progeny demonstrates that the Supreme Court’s adoption of the shocks-the-conscience
standard for substantive due process violations has imposed a nearly insurmountable obstacle to holding government officials responsible for their abuses of power”).
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Currently, there are only four circuits139 that have decided
what standard should govern the imposition of liability on psychiatrists, acting on behalf of the state, in challenges to wrongful civil
commitments. These circuits are split on the issue of which standard
should prevail.140 This disagreement does not involve their shared
failure to incorporate the O’Connor requirements into their standards.
A.

The Third and Tenth Circuits

The Third and the Tenth Circuits adopted the “shocks-theconscience” standard, a standard that was announced by the Supreme
Court in County of Sacramento v. Lewis.141 Under this Lewis standard, a psychiatrist would be liable for wrongful civil commitment only if his or her decision to commit shocked-the-conscience.142 There
are several important aspects of Lewis that need to be clarified.
First, Lewis did not involve a challenge to one’s civil confinement.143 Rather, Lewis involved the establishment of a “standard
of culpability on the part of a law enforcement officer for violating
substantive due process in a pursuit case.”144 The case stemmed from
a high-speed police pursuit of two teenagers on a motorcycle that resulted in the death of one of the youths.145 The parents of the deceased boy brought a lawsuit claiming that the police officers violat139
See Benn, 371 F.3d 165; Bolmer, 594 F.3d 134; Jensen, 312 F.3d 1145; Rodriguez, 72
F.3d 1051; Obado, 524 F. App'x 812; James, 1998 WL 664315, at *1 (representing the Second, Third, Ninth and Tenth Circuits, respectively).
140
Compare Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1063 (imposing liability on state psychiatrists for
wrongful civil commitments only if the committing mental health professional’s decision to
confine was made on the basis that is “substantially below the standards generally accepted
in the medical community”), Bolmer, 594 F.3d at 143 (same), and Jensen, 312 F.3d at 1147
(same), with Benn, 371 F.3d at 174 (imposing liability on state psychiatrists only if their decision to commit, under the circumstances, “shocks the conscience”), Obado, 524 F. App'x
at 815 (same), and James, 1998 WL 664315, at *7 (same).
141
523 U.S. 833 (1998).
142
See Benn, 371 F.3d at 174; Obado, 524 F. App'x at 815; James, 1998 WL 664315, at
*7.
143
See Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
144
Id. at 839.
145
Id. at 836-37.
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ed their son’s Fourteenth Amendment right to life.146
The district court granted summary judgment for the police
officer on the theory of qualified immunity.147 The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed and established that “the appropriate
degree of fault to be applied to high-speed police pursuits is deliberate indifference to, or reckless disregard for, a person’s right to life
and personal security.”148 In rejecting the standard established by the
Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court announced that the only “level of
executive abuse of power” that violates substantive due process rights
is one that “shocks the conscience.”149 Furthermore, the Court declared, “only the most egregious executive action can be said to be
‘arbitrary’ in the constitutional sense.”150
Second, it is vital to understand the significance of Lewis.
Lewis did not merely establish a new standard—it went beyond
that.151 It created an entire framework for analyzing imposition of liability for the State’s wrongful conduct.152 It provided that “[t]he
conscience-shocking concept points clearly away from liability, or
clearly toward it, only at the ends of the tort law’s culpability spectrum.”153 To demonstrate this, the Court held that mere negligence
on the part of the State does not shock the conscience and does not
trigger the imposition of liability.154
However, when the state official’s conduct stems from the
middle range of the culpability spectrum, such as recklessness or
gross negligence, the Supreme Court held that such conduct requires
a more careful investigation.155 The Court provided for a possibility
146

Id. at 837.
Id. at 837-38.
148
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 838 (quoting Sacramento Cnty. v. Lewis, 98 F.3d 434, 441 (9th Cir.
1996)).
149
Id. at 846.
150
Id. at 834.
151
See Bolmer, 594 F.3d at 142 (explaining that “[t]he Court indicated . . . that the shocksthe-conscience inquiry is not a stand-alone test for determining whether particular executive
conduct violates substantive due process; rather, it provides a framework for making such a
determination”).
152
Id.
153
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 834.
154
Id. (providing that “[l]iability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the
constitutional due process threshold”).
155
Id. at 849 (providing that “[w]hether the point of the conscience shocking is reached
when injuries are produced with culpability falling within the middle range, following from
something more than negligence but ‘less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or
gross negligence,’ is a matter for closer calls”).
147
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of imposition of liability156 and emphasized that “some official acts in
this range may be actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment.”157
The Court explained that “[r]ules of due process are not . . . subject to
mechanical application”158 because “[d]eliberate indifference that
shocks in one environment may not be so patently egregious in another.”159 To determine whether liability is to follow, the Court
called for “an exact analysis of circumstances before any abuse of
power is condemned as conscience shocking.”160
When it comes to intentional conduct on the part of state officials, the Court held that “conduct deliberately intended to injure . . .
is the sort of official action most likely to rise to the conscienceshocking level.”161 Civil commitment involves intent in its clearest
form.162 For example, the court in Demarco v. Sadiker163 acknowledged that liberty deprivation through civil commitment is “the result
of a[n] . . . intentional act of confinement.”164 Thus, pursuant to Lewis, an intentional act of civil commitment that lacked a constitutional
basis of mental illness and dangerousness would result in the imposition of liability. Unfortunately, the courts which adopted the standard
are yet to conform to this analysis.
For instance, in 2004, in Benn v. Universal Health System,
165
Inc., the Third Circuit addressed the issue of the governing standard in actions for liability resulting from wrongful civil commitments.166 Donald Benn brought an action against those involved in
his short-term involuntary confinement.167 Among several allegations, one involved a concern that the examining psychiatrists fol-

156

Id.
Id.
158
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 834.
162
See, e.g., Demarco v. Sadiker, 897 F. Supp. 693, 702 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that
“where . . . a plaintiff alleges that he was intentionally committed to a mental hospital without the requisite finding of dangerousness and/or without his actually being dangerous, he
has sufficiently plead the mens rea requirement of a § 1983 cause of action based upon a due
process violation”).
163
897 F. Supp. 693 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
164
Id. at 700.
165
371 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2004).
166
Id. at 174.
167
Id. at 167.
157
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lowed a “seriously defective evaluative process,”168 which led them
to conclude that Benn met the criteria for emergency confinement.169
On appeal from summary judgment granted to the defendants, the
Third Circuit provided that “[i]n a due process challenge to executive
action, the threshold question is whether the behavior of the governmental officer is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be
said to shock the contemporary conscience.”170
In adopting the Lewis approach, the Third Circuit also expressed that “whether or not . . . [the psychiatrists] properly analyzed
Benn’s condition, their conduct did not violate substantive due process.”171 In other words, the court held that regardless of a possible
inaccuracy of the psychiatrists’ determination of Benn’s dangerousness, the order to commit a non-dangerous or non-mentally ill patient
did not shock the conscience.172 This conclusion again avoids constitutional protections afforded to the mentally ill by O’Connor. In
2013, the Third Circuit, in Obado v. UMDNJ, Behavioral Health
Center,173 reaffirmed that “the appropriate test for assessing liability
in the context of involuntary commitment decisions is the ‘shocks the
conscience’ standard announced in Lewis.”174 Similar to the court in
Benn, the court in Obado did not find the psychiatrists’ intentional act
of commitment conscience-shocking.175
In 1998, the Tenth Circuit also adopted the Lewis standard.176
In James v. Grand Lake Mental Health Center, Inc.,177 Jeannie James
brought an action against nine defendants for her wrongful civil
commitment.178 The district court dismissed all of her claims.179 The
Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision and held that the alleged conduct by the defendants did not rise to the level of conscience shocking and, thus, did not violate James’s substantive due
168

Id. at 172.
Id.
170
Benn, 371 F.3d at 174 (citing Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847).
171
Id. at 175.
172
Id.
173
524 Fed. App’x. 812 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 986 (2014).
174
Id. at 815.
175
Id.
176
See James, 1998 WL 664315, at *7 (holding that plaintiff’s “allegations would not rise
to the “shocks the conscience” standard articulated by the Supreme Court for substantive due
process claims”).
177
No. 97-5157, 1998 WL 664315 (10th Cir. Sept. 24, 1998).
178
Id. at *1.
179
Id. at *2.
169
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process rights.180 Unfortunately, this circuit also failed to incorporate
the O’Connor requirements of mental illness and dangerousness, thus
failing to provide protections to non-dangerous individuals.
B.

The Second and Ninth Circuits

The Second Circuit was the first to decide what standard
should govern when imposing liability on state psychiatrists for
wrongful civil commitments. This court was also the first to depart
from O’Connor’s dangerousness analysis. Instead, the court adopted
a standard that heavily resembles the standard announced by the Supreme Court in Youngberg v. Romeo181 in 1982.182 As a result, in
1995, the Second Circuit, in Rodriguez v. City of New York,183 established that only where the psychiatrist’s commitment decision is
based on criteria that are “substantially below the standards generally
accepted in the medical community,” or, in other words, the decision
to commit was grossly negligent, will liability follow.184
In 1993, Florangel Rodriguez commenced an action challenging her emergency, involuntary, short-term civil confinement, when
the evaluating psychiatrists concluded that “[s]he . . . [was] a potential danger to herself and would benefit from hospitalization.”185 Rodriguez vigorously contested these clinical conclusions, alleging that
180

Id. at *7.
457 U.S. 307 (1982).
182
In Youngberg, the Court explored the substantive due process rights of institutionalized
patients within an institution and state actions that violated those rights. Id. at 309. Nicholas
Romeo, while permanently committed to a state institution, allegedly sustained injuries on at
least sixty-three occasions, during the duration of his civil commitment. Id. at 310. His
mother brought a suit challenging the conditions of his confinement. Id. The Court emphasized that Romeo “does not challenge the commitment” and “neither respondent nor his family seeks his discharge from state care.” Id. at 315, 329. Rather, they alleged that Romeo
had a substantive due process right to safety, freedom of movement, and training within the
institution. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315. They further alleged that these rights were violated
by the officials’ failure to meet such constitutional requirements of civil commitment. Id.
The Supreme Court established that one’s “liberty interests require the State to provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint.”
Id. at 319. However, “liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional
is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as
to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Id. at 323.
183
72 F.3d 1051 (2d Cir. 1995).
184
See id. at 1063 (finding that “whether an individual is to be summarily deprived of her
liberty—be exercised on the basis of substantive and procedural criteria that are not substantially below the standards generally accepted in the medical community”).
185
Id. at 1055.
181
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the medical entries by the examining psychiatrists “in many respects
inaccurately or incompletely depicted the statements made by Rodriguez”186 and that the psychiatrists “took Rodriguez’s statements out
of context.”187 She further contested the durations of her examinations and the manner in which they were conducted.188 Lastly, plaintiff provided competing clinical findings and testimony by an independent psychiatrist who concluded that the examination by the
committing mental health professionals was full of “glaring errors.”189 Such errors ranged from examining Rodriguez for suicidal
risk for an insufficient amount of time to failing to inquire into the
truthfulness of some of the statements that she allegedly made.190
The trial court granted summary judgment to the state defendants.191 On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the trial court’s decision and remanded the case.192 To guide lower courts in similar proceedings, the court declared that a physician’s “judgment—affecting
whether an individual is to be summarily deprived of her liberty—be
exercised on the basis of substantive and procedural criteria that are
not substantially below the standards generally accepted in the medical community. Due process requires no less.”193
Fifteen years later, in 2010, the Second Circuit had an opportunity to revisit Rodriguez. In Bolmer v. Oliveira,194 the court reaffirmed that “an involuntary commitment violates substantive due
process if the decision to commit is made on the basis of ‘substantive
and procedural criteria that are . . . substantially below the standards
generally accepted in the medical community.’ ”195 Bolmer was
committed on an involuntary and emergency basis following his
evaluation that lasted somewhere between five and fifteen196 minutes
by the psychiatrist who was never previously involved in his care.197
Brett Bolmer alleged sexual involvement with his case man186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197

Id.
Id. at 1056.
Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1055-56.
Id. at 1056.
Id. at 1056-57.
Id. at 1053.
Id. at 1066.
Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1063.
594 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2010).
Id. at 139 (citing Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1063).
Id. at 138.
Id.
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ager, who he had known personally, prior to the beginning of their
professional relationship.198 The treatment team did not believe the
allegations199 and attributed them to Bolmer’s manifestation of “erotomania,”200 a form of delusion. Bolmer’s psychiatric evaluation followed and, as a result, he was transported to a hospital where he was
strapped to the bed and administered anti-psychotic medication.201
When the hospital staff discovered numerous text messages between
Bolmer and his case manager and confirmed the existence of communication between the two, Brett Bolmer was discharged.202 He
brought a lawsuit alleging a violation of his substantive due process
rights.203
The defense argued that Rodriguez did not govern the issue
because it was decided in 1995, prior to Lewis.204 Rather, the defense
argued that Lewis, decided by the Supreme Court three years after
Rodriguez, should become the principal standard. The Second Circuit in Bolmer was faced with the task of reconciling the two standards.205
The court responded to the defense’s argument for adoption
of Lewis by declaring that “the shocks-the-conscience inquiry is not a
stand-alone test for determining whether particular executive conduct
violates substantive due process.”206 Rather, such determination
should be based on specific surrounding context.207 The Second Circuit held that the decision of a physician “to involuntarily commit a
mentally ill person because he poses a danger to himself or others
shocks the conscience, thereby violating substantive due process,
when the decision is based on ‘substantive and procedural criteria
that are . . . substantially below the standards generally accepted in

198

Id. at 137.
Bolmer, 594 F.3d at 137-38.
200
Id.
201
Id. at 138.
202
Id.
203
Id. at 139.
204
See Bolmer, 594 F.3d at 137 (“Oliveira argues that the medical-standards test . . . is
inconsistent with [Lewis]” because “it imposes liability for conduct that does not ‘shock the
conscience.’ ”).
205
See Bolmer, 594 F.3d at 143 (addressing Oliveira’s contention that “the district court
erred by applying Rodriguez’s medical-standards test instead of determining whether
Oliveira’s conduct shocked the conscience under Lewis”).
206
Id. at 142.
207
Id. at 142-43.
199
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the medical community.’ ”208 Therefore, since Rodriguez imposes liability for the conduct that, at a minimum, can be classified as grossly
negligent209 and Lewis does not preclude liability for such a middlerange culpability level,210 the court found that “Rodriguez is consistent with Lewis.”211
In adhering to the standard that essentially resembles Youngberg, another Supreme Court decision that will be discussed later, the
Second Circuit departed from what O’Connor urged the courts to do,
namely, to analyze whether or not the individual who allegedly suffered a deprivation of liberty was mentally ill and dangerous at the
time of his or her commitment.212 Instead, the court implemented a
standard that would inquire whether the decision to commit was
made on the basis that is “substantially below the standards generally
accepted in the medical community[,]” or, in other words, whether
the psychiatrist’s level of culpability reached the required level of
gross negligence for liability to follow.213 Similar to the Second Circuit, in 2002, the Ninth Circuit in Jensen v. Lane County214 also
adopted the standard announced in Rodriguez.215
C.

Reasons for Incorporating O’Connor’s
Dangerousness Requirement into the Two Existing
Legal Standards.

There are several reasons why federal courts should incorporate O’Connor’s dangerousness requirement into their existing legal
standards. First, the two Supreme Court decisions, Lewis and Youngberg, which constitute bases for currently employed standards, are
not quite on point nor are they relevant to wrongful commitment
challenges. For example, the Second and Ninth Circuits’ standard of
“substantially below the standards generally accepted in the medical
community,” or in other words, a gross negligence standard, resembles the standard announced by the Supreme Court in Youngberg.216
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216

Id. at 143 (quoting Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1063).
Id. at 144.
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849.
Bolmer, 594 F.3d at 137.
O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 576.
Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1063.
312 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1147.
See, e.g., Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1063; Bolmer, 594 F.3d at 143; Jensen, 312 F.3d at
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The plaintiff in Youngberg did not challenge his confinement.217 Rather, he challenged conditions of his confinement.218 Therefore, a
gross negligence standard is more appropriate in challenges to confinement conditions, such as right to treatment. In other words, the
government should not be held to the same standard when it provides
something, such as institutional care, as when it takes something
away. This especially holds true when what the government is taking
away involves a fundamental right.
The Lewis “shocks-the-conscience” standard, adopted by the
Third and the Tenth Circuits, resulted from the case in which the defendant police officers had “no intent to harm suspects physically or
to worsen their legal plight.”219 Unlike the police officers in Lewis
who unintentionally engaged in a deadly chase, psychiatrists always
commit with intent220 and O’Connor pertains precisely to this level of
culpability spectrum.221

1147.
217

Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315 (emphasizing that the plaintiff did “not challenge the
commitment”); see id. at 329 (Burger, J., concurring) (reiterating that the plaintiff did not
seek “his discharge from state care”).
218
Id. at 315 (explaining that the plaintiff-respondent “argues that he has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in safety, freedom of movement, and training within the institution; and that petitioners infringed these rights by failing to provide constitutionally required
conditions of confinement”).
219
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 854 (emphasis added).
220
See, e.g., Demarco, 897 F. Supp. at 699. Plaintiff argued that the act of confinement
was intentional because “it was defendants' decision to act on their belief that plaintiff was
dangerous, rather than the belief itself, that deprived him of his liberty.” Id. The defendant
did not dispute that “every involuntary confinement under the mental hygiene statute is a
deliberate act.” Id. The court agreed that “[t]he alleged deprivation of plaintiff's liberty in
the case at bar was the result of a[n] . . . intentional act of confinement.” Id. at 700. See also
Plain v. Flicker, 645 F. Supp. 898, 904 n.4 (D.N.J. 1986) (“Since the examiner is the initial
decisionmaker it raises the question whether a psychiatrist might have an incentive to commit for the week prior to the judicial hearing. This ‘puts the psychiatrist in the selfaggrandizing position of being able to recruit one's own involuntary clients.’ ”).
221
See Jones, 463 U.S. at 379 (emphasizing that “strong institutional biases lead . . . [psychiatrists] to err when they attempt to determine an individual's dangerousness, especially
when the consequence of a finding of dangerousness is that an obviously mentally ill patient
will remain within their control”); see also James, 1998 WL 664315, at *2 (concerning an
allegation that some civil commitments take place to satisfy doctors’ “sadistic desires . . . to
make an example to others”); see also Brooks, supra note 6, at 265-66 (discussing numerous
reasons that lie behind psychiatrists’ intent to commit, including psychiatrists’ lack of ability
to properly assess for dangerousness that leads them to err on the side of caution and overcommit; psychiatrists’ strong support of providing institutionalized treatment regardless of
the dangerousness status of an individual; psychiatrists’ belief that the former “need for
treatment” requirement is the proper standard; as well as psychiatrists’ fear of liability for
releasing an individual, who is, in fact, dangerous into society).
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The second reason federal courts should incorporate
O’Connor’s dangerousness requirement into their existing legal
standards is because the adoption of the presently utilized standards
marked the establishment of another pro-psychiatrist era in the law.
Prior to Rodriguez, the Second Circuit inquired as to “whether it was
objectively reasonable for the defendants to believe, at the time they
examined [the mentally ill patient] and in light of the information that
they possessed, that [the patient] was dangerous.”222 After Rodriguez, the issue became whether the decision to commit was made on
the basis of “substantive and procedural criteria that are not substantially below the standards generally accepted in the medical community” or, in other words, whether the decision to commit was grossly
negligent.223
Rodriguez did not merely change the legal standard; it partially contradicted O’Connor. The Court in O’Connor would support
the proposition that it is vital for psychiatrists to “make not just an assessment, but the correct assessment”224 and any “state official who
intentionally confines a person who is a danger neither to himself nor
others would be liable for damages.”225 However, the Second Circuit
disagreed.226 It declared in Rodriguez that “due process does not require a guarantee that a physician’s assessment of the likelihood of
serious harm be correct”227 and it does not expect committing physicians to be “omniscient” in their decisions.228 All due process requires is that the decision be “made in accordance with a standard
that promises some reasonable degree of accuracy.”229 While the
court recognized that “[e]rroneous commitments . . . implicate the individual’s interest in liberty,”230 it held that so long as other psychiatrists would make the same mistaken conclusion about one’s dangerousness, the state actors would not be liable for wrongful civil
commitment.231 This holding contradicts Jones, where the Supreme
Court provided that “the Government has a strong interest in accu222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231

Glass v. Mayas, 984 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1993).
Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1063.
Demarco, 897 F. Supp. at 702.
Id. at 700.
Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1062.
Id.
Id. at 1063.
Id. at 1062.
Id. at 1061-62 (quoting Goetz v. Crosson, 967 F.2d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 1992)).
Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1063, 1065.
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rate, efficient commitment decisions.”232 In allowing committing
psychiatrists to make incorrect conclusions, so long as these determinations are “not substantially below the standards generally accepted
in the medical community,”233 the Second Circuit would find no substantive due process violation in commitments of individuals who
pose no danger to themselves or others.234 Therefore, the Second
Circuit’s logic violates O’Connor, which allows civil confinement
only if an individual is both mentally ill and dangerous.235
When applying the shocks-the-conscience standard, in theory,
the court would impose liability for wrongful civil commitment because Lewis clearly declared that “conduct deliberately intended to
injure . . . is the sort of official action most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level.”236 Every commitment is an intentional
act.237 Unfortunately, in practice, the law is not so efficient and the
courts that adhere to this standard have yet to find any psychiatrist’s
decision to commit, even a non-dangerous individual, conscienceshocking.238 To rectify this injustice, the jurisdictions that adopted
the conscience-shocking standard should first decide the factual issue
of whether the individual was dangerous at the time of his or her confinement. Only if the factfinder concludes the individual was not, in
fact, dangerous, should the court proceed to the issue of whether the
psychiatrist’s decision to commit the non-dangerous individual was
conscience-shocking. Thus, the incorporation of O’Connor’s dangerousness requirement would balance the constitutional protections
afforded to the mentally ill and protections afforded to state psychiatrists under the rigid shocks-the-conscience standard.

232

Jones, 463 U.S. at 377.
Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1063.
234
Id.
235
O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 576.
236
Lewis, 523 U.S. 834.
237
See Demarco, 897 F. Supp. at 699 (“[T]he intentional act of keeping plaintiff in administrative custody provided sufficient state of mind to state a § 1983 action, regardless whether the failure to provide due process was without fault.”) (citing Sourbeer v. Robinson, 791
F.2d 1094, 1105 (3d Cir. 1986)).
238
See, e.g., Benn, 371 F.3d at 174; Obado, 524 F. App'x at 815; James, 1998 WL
664315, at *7.
233
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CONCLUSION

Civil commitment exists to provide a high level of supervised
psychiatric care for individuals who are so severely affected by mental illness that community-based services can no longer support and
maintain their psychiatric stability. When such instability causes erratic behaviors that put the mentally ill or third parties in danger, civil
commitment is an appropriate remedy.239 At first glance, it may
sound like a straightforward concept. However, it is not.
History of civil commitments can help in understanding the
issue. From the commencement of civil commitment practice until
the mid-twentieth century, psychiatrists had the sole extensive and
unrestricted power to determine an individual’s “need for treatment.”240 Those deemed to be in need of treatment were civilly confined, often for many years.241 To determine whether or not one was
in need of treatment, psychiatrists relied on their clinical judgments.242 Lack of any legal requirement to support such clinical
judgments often led to abuses of power.243 An era of new research in
the field of psychiatry, development of new anti-psychotic medications, and a rebirth of the civil rights movement revealed concerns of
abuse and arbitrariness that, at times, stood behind psychiatrists’ clinical judgments.244
In 1975, the Supreme Court acknowledged these concerns and
proclaimed that only those mentally ill individuals who pose a danger
to self or others can be civilly committed.245 The foundational intention behind the dual requirement was to restrict the power of psychiatrists to confine by providing more objective criteria.246 The courts
were to inquire into the soundness of psychiatrists’ determinations
and to make the final decision.247 These safeguards were placed to
protect constitutional rights of the mentally ill. However, soon it be239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247

O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 575.
See Appelbaum, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 575.
See Brooks, supra note 6, at 262-63.
See Brooks, supra note 6, at 263.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss1/12

30

Walker: O'Connor's Dangerous Requirement

2014

O’CONNOR’S DANGEROUSNESS REQUIREMENT

179

came evident that the dangerousness standard was not without its limitations.
For example, while there is no doubt that psychiatrists can diagnose mental illness within a reasonable degree of medical certainty,
it soon became clear that the same cannot be said for their ability to
predict dangerousness.248 Studies revealed that for several reasons,
psychiatrists extensively overpredict when determining whether a
person is dangerous.249 First, the concept of danger is vague.250 Jurisdictions across the country fail to provide precise definitions that
would incorporate all aspects of danger and disagree about what it
entails.251 This failure allows psychiatrists to craft their own subjective understanding of what dangerousness incorporates and fit the reported symptoms into those personalized definitions.252 Second,
mental health professionals often rely on their clinical judgments rather than on actuarial methods of prediction when assessing dangerousness.253 In practice, this means that judges have no way of testing
psychiatrists’ assessment conclusions, because these conclusions are
based solely on psychiatrists’ professional experience. Third, regardless of the courts’ awareness about psychiatrists’ lack of proficiency
in detecting dangerousness, courts still heavily defer to psychiatrists’
expert testimony during commitment hearings.254 Fourth, mental
health professionals fear liability if they fail to confine a dangerous
mentally ill person.255 On the other hand, they rarely face liability if
they confine a non-dangerous mentally ill person.256 The rare challenges to wrongful civil confinements face very pro-psychiatrist legal

248
249
250
251
252
253

See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
Id.
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Stevens, 761 P.2d at 772-73 nn.4-7; see also supra note 119.
See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
See Brooks, supra note 6, at 272:
[O]nly a minority, and maybe a small minority, of mental health professionals employ structured risk assessment techniques . . . despite advances in knowledge about the risk of violence by people with mental
illness, there have been virtually no . . . efforts to incorporate the information into a useful, empirically-based framework for clinical assessment.

Id.
254
255
256

See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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standards that govern imposition of liability.257
Currently, the circuits are split on the appropriate standard to
determine whether liability should be imposed on a state psychiatrist
for a wrongful civil commitment. The Second and Ninth Circuits only impose liability if the decision to confine a mentally ill person, regardless of whether he or she was in fact dangerous at the time of civil commitment, was based on judgment that is “substantially below
the standards generally accepted in the medical community.”258
There is no requirement for psychiatrists to be correct in their judgments at all.259 Therefore, so long as other psychiatrists would also
wrongfully confine, liability does not follow. The Third and Tenth
Circuits impose liability on psychiatrists only if the decision to commit a mentally ill individual, dangerous or not, “shocks the conscience.”260
Neither one of the adopted standards takes into account the
constitutional protections imposed by the Supreme Court in
O’Connor.261 Under O’Connor, the only way a mentally ill person
can be constitutionally deprived of his or her liberty is if he or she
poses a threat to self or others.262 Thus, courts fail to recognize that
as soon as a psychiatrist makes an erroneous decision to confine a
non-dangerous mentally ill person, the wrongfully civilly confined
individual is being deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment
right to liberty, and liability should follow.
To reconcile the discrepancy in protections afforded by the
courts to mental health professionals and the mentally ill, the courts
should incorporate O’Connor’s dangerousness requirement into their
current standards. To avoid further manipulations of the concept of
dangerousness, states and courts should define what this concept involves. Psychiatrists should be required to utilize reliable methods of
dangerousness prediction. Courts should consider utilizing independent expert testimony at trial to test committing psychiatrists’
conclusions. Lastly, legal professionals who represent mentally ill
individuals should demonstrate the utmost level of advocacy during
257
258
259
260

See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1063.
Id. at 1062.
See Benn, 371 F.3d at 174; Obado, 524 F. App'x at 815; James, 1998 WL 664315, at

*7.
261
See Benn, 371 F.3d 165; Bolmer, 594 F.3d 134; Jensen, 312 F.3d 1145; Rodriguez, 72
F.3d 1051; Obado, 524 F. App'x 812; James, 1998 WL 664315, at *1.
262
O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 575.
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commitment hearings to prevent wrongful civil confinements. They
should remember that strong legal representation might be the only
hope that people affected by mental illness have. By securing all
these safeguards, the law will be able to provide mentally ill individuals with the level of protection the Fourteenth Amendment requires.
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